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Abstract
This paper investigates systemic risk in the insurance industry. We first analyze the systemic
contribution of the insurance industry vis-a`-vis other industries by applying 3 measures,
namely the linear Granger causality test, conditional value at risk and marginal expected
shortfall, on 3 groups, namely banks, insurers and non-financial companies listed in Europe
over the last 14 years. We then analyze the determinants of the systemic risk contribution
within the insurance industry by using balance sheet level data in a broader sample. Our
evidence suggests that i) the insurance industry shows a persistent systemic relevance over
time and plays a subordinate role in causing systemic risk compared to banks, and that ii)
within the industry, those insurers which engage more in non-insurance-related activities
tend to pose more systemic risk. In addition, we are among the first to provide empirical
evidence on the role of diversification as potential determinant of systemic risk in the in-
surance industry. Finally, we confirm that size is also a significant driver of systemic risk,
whereas price-to-book ratio and leverage display counterintuitive results.
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1 Introduction
Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the 2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis,
the concept of systemic risk has become increasingly relevant.1 After the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in particular, the debate on systemic risk has been primarily focused on banks.2
However, recent empirical evidence suggests that institutions not traditionally associated with
systemic risk, such as insurance companies, also play a prominent role in posing systemic risk.
In particular, some authors find that the insurance industry has become a non-negligible source
of systemic risk (e.g. Billio et al. (2012) and Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014)). This is partially
in contrast to other authors, who do not find evidence of systemic relevance for the industry
as a whole (e.g. Harrington (2009), Bell and Keller (2009) and Geneva Association (2010)).
Finally, other authors take a more granular perspective and argue that insurance companies
might be systemically relevant, but that such risk stems from non-traditional (banking-related)
activities (Baluch et al. (2011) and Cummins and Weiss (2014)) and that in general, the systemic
relevance of the insurance industry as a whole is still subordinated with respect to the banking
industry (Chen et al., 2014).
As the current literature does not provide a common understanding and clear evidence
regarding the systemic relevance of the insurance industry and the activities connected thereto,
we thus aim with this paper to fill this gap. In particular, we investigate i) the systemic
relevance of the insurance industry vis-a`-vis other industries and ii) the key drivers of systemic
risk within the insurance industry.
To do so, we test 3 equity return-based measures of systemic risk, namely 1) the indexes
based on linear Granger causality tests proposed by Billio et al. (2012) (Granger test), 2) the
conditional value at risk proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) (∆CoVaR) and 3) the
dynamic marginal expected shortfall proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2012) (DMES), on 3
groups, namely banks, insurers and non-financial companies, all listed in Europe. We test the
systemic relevance of each institution with respect to its own industry (intra-industry), with
respect to other industries and with respect to the total system. Based on these estimations, we
rank financial institutions according to their average systemic risk contribution over time and
create an industry composition index. Finally, we investigate the drivers of systemic risk within
1Throughout this paper, we rely on the definition of systemic risk given by the Group of Ten (2001): Systemic
risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in a substantial segment of the
financial system that is serious enough to have significant adverse effects on the real economy with high probability.
2Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008.
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the insurance industry by focusing on the asset and liability composition of insurers’ balance
sheets.
Our evidence suggests that the insurance industry tends to persistently pose systemic risk
over time and to play a subordinate role with respect to the banking industry, with some
distinction in specific periods when the insurance industry becomes more systemic than the
banking industry. Furthermore, we show that insurers with a relatively larger proportion of
non-insurance-related activities tend to pose more systemic risk. In addition, we are among
the first to provide evidence on the role of diversification of the asset portfolio with respect
to systemic risk. We also find and confirm previous evidence that price-to-book and size do
matter, whereas leverage seems to play an ambiguous role. Finally, our results are robust across
different specifications and different samples.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a comprehensive literature review,
section 3 describes the methodology and the data; section 4 describes the results and section 5
concludes the analysis.
2 Literature review
The literature on systemic risk has been steadily growing following the crises.3 In particular,
a wide range of new empirical methods for testing the systemic risk contribution of financial
institutions has been proposed. Moreover, both academia and regulators have dedicated more
attention to the role of non-banking financial institutions: among these institutions, insurance
companies emerged as a potential source of systemic risk.4
Before the crises, there was substantial agreement among scholars in considering the in-
surance industry to be not systemically relevant. However, in the literature that emerged in
the aftermath of the crises, although many studies still consider the insurance industry non-
systemically relevant as a whole, some authors argued that the insurance industry might have
become systemically relevant, particularly in a number of specific activities. Many agree in
ranking non-core life insurance activities as the most systemically relevant, whereas core non-
life insurance activities are considered the least systemically relevant. In addition, an ambiguous
position is attributed to reinsurance activities.5
3By crises we mean both the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the 2010-2012 European sovereign crisis.
4A comprehensive review of the literature on systemic risk in the insurance industry is provided by Eling and
Pankoke (2012).
5Studies by Swiss Re (2003) and by The Group of Thirty (2006) tend to exclude any systemic relevance for
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Cummins and Weiss (2014) argue that according to primary indicators and contributing
factors, such as leverage, interconnectedness and size of exposure to credit, market and liquidity
risk, the most systemically relevant activities are non-core activities conducted mainly by life
insurers. Moreover, Harrington (2009) concludes that systemic risk is potentially higher for life
insurers due to the higher leverage, sensitivity to asset value decline and potential policyholder
withdrawals during a financial crisis, whereas systemic relevance is relatively low in property and
casualty (P&C) insurance due to low leverage ratios. Furthermore, by analyzing the takeover of
AIG by the Federal Government in the United States, the author suggests that the AIG crisis
was heavily influenced by the credit default swaps (CDS) written by AIG financial products and
not by more traditional insurance products written by AIG’s regulated insurance subsidiaries.
The Geneva Association (2010) conducted an analysis on the role played by insurers during the
2008 crisis and argues that the substantial differences between banks and insurance companies,
namely the long-term liability structure of insurers compared to banks and the strong cash flow
granted by the inversion of the cycle, is sufficient to rule out systemically any implications of the
insurance industry during the financial crises aside from the companies highly exposed towards
non-core insurance activities. Bell and Keller (2009) analyze the relevant risk factors stemming
from an insurance company and conclude that traditional insurers do not pose systemic risk
and, as a consequence, are neither too big nor too interconnected to fail, and that insurers
engaging in non-traditional activities, such as CDS, can pose substantial systemic risk. Baluch
et al. (2011) provide further arguments for the lower relevance of P&C activities and the higher
relevance of non-traditional life activities: the authors argue that the fundamental reason lies in
the bank-like business type and the massive amount of interconnectedness needed to run these
kinds of activities.
The concept of interconnection, as expressed, among others, in Baluch et al. (2011), rep-
resents the link between analyses focused on industry-specific characteristics and more general
equity-based analyses in which prices reflect all the necessary information.6 Equity-based mea-
sures aim to measure the effect of one institution on the system or vice versa and the level of
interconnectedness of the system. These measures include the ∆CoVaR (Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2011)), the MES and DMES (Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012)), the
Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP) (Huang et al. (2012)), Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA)
the reinsurance business. On the other hand, Cummins and Weiss (2014) claim that, despite historical evidence,
both life and P&C insurers are exposed to reinsurance crises.
6A comprehensive review of the models applied to systemic risk is provided by Bisias et al. (2012).
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(Gray and Jobst (2011)) and the linear and non-linear Granger causality test proposed by Billio
et al. (2012). According to such measures, the insurance industry displays different degrees
of systemic relevance. For instance, Acharya et al. (2010) argue that insurance companies are
overall the least systemically relevant financial institutions. The authors provide estimations of
the spillover effects through a measure of conditional capital shortfall, i.e. Systemic Expected
Shortfall (SES) and MES for the U.S. financial industry during the 2007-2009 crisis. The con-
tribution of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) extends the traditional value at risk concept to
the entire financial system conditional on institutions being in distress. The authors apply the
measure to a set of institutions, including banks and thrifts, investment banks, government
sponsored enterprises and insurance companies, finding no distinction among the systemic rel-
evance of different types of institutions. In contrast, Billio et al. (2012) apply the linear and
non linear Granger causality test to a sample of banks, insurers, hedge funds and broker dealers
operating in the U.S. in order to establish pairwise Granger causality among equity returns
of financial institutions. Their evidence suggests that during the 2008 financial crisis, besides
banks, insurance companies were a major source of systemic risk. This conclusion is partially
in contrast to Chen et al. (2014): the authors agree that the linear Granger causality test
attributes a systemic relevance to insurance companies comparable to the systemic relevance
of banks. However, they argue that when applying a linear and non-linear Granger causality
test to the same series corrected for heteroskedasticity, banks tend to cause more systemic risk
and for longer periods of time then insurance companies. Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014) and
Bierth et al. (2015) focus directly on the link between equity-based systemic risk measures and
industry-specific fundamentals. Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014) estimate the systemic risk contri-
bution based on ∆CoVaR and MES for a sample of U.S. insurers during the 2007-2008 crisis,
inferring that insurers that were most exposed to systemic risk were on average larger, relied
more heavily on non-policyholder liabilities and had higher ratios of investment income to net
revenues. Bierth et al. (2015) analyze a much broader sample of insurers over a longer time
horizon and find that the systemic risk contribution of the insurance sector is relatively small.
However, they also argue that the contribution of insurers to systemic risk peaked during the
2007-2008 financial crisis and find that the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insur-
ance industry is a significant driver of the insurers exposure to systemic risk. Finally, they argue
that the contribution of insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by leverage,
loss ratios and funding fragility.
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Concluding, the existing literature provides a diversified and controversial picture of the
systemic relevance of the insurance industry. In particular, there is a lack of empirical evidence
on the link between industry-specific activities and their contribution to systemic risk measured
by equity prices. On the one hand, some studies argue that due to its nature, the insurance
industry does not pose systemic risk, and therefore measures based on equity values might
be misled by spurious effects (e.g. increased risk aversion vis-a`-vis the financial industry); on
the other hand, some studies provide evidence on the role of the insurance industry in posing
systemic risk and its growing importance in recent years. Yet, few studies attempt to analyze
empirically the relative position of the insurance industry vis-a`-vis other industries and the
key drivers within the insurance industry. This contribution thus aims at bridging this gap by
investigating the systemic risk contribution of the insurance industry relative to other industries
and the key determinants on the balance sheet of insurers. Moreover, this is the first study that
focuses on European insurers.
3 Methodology & Data
Our analysis consists of 2 steps:
i) we conduct an analysis of the systemic risk contribution of the insurance industry vis-a`-vis
other industries using equity-based measures of system risk (industry analysis);
ii) we then conduct an empirical analysis at balance sheet level of a broader sample of Euro-
pean insurers based on their systemic risk contribution (analysis of fundamentals).
3.1 Systemic Risk Measures and Rankings of Systemic Risk Contributions
For the industry analysis, we apply 3 widely used equity-based measures of systemic risk:
1) the Granger causality test proposed by Billio et al. (2012), 2) the ∆CoVaR proposed by
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and 3) the DMES proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2012).7
We identify 3 groups, namely banks, insurers and non-financials. In addition, for each systemic
risk measure and for each group, we distinguish between 3 cases: the average contribution of
the individual institution belonging to a single group a) within its group (intra-industry), b)
towards the other 2 groups (other industries) and c) towards all 3 groups (total system).8 We
7An extensive mathematical treatment of the 3 measures is provided in Appendix A.1.
8An extensive mathematical explanation of how the 3 cases are calculated is provided in Appendix A.1.
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then calculate the average contribution of each industry by taking the median of the month (for
the ∆CoVaR and the DMES, whereas the Granger causality test is calculated on a monthly
basis) and the average through the institutions of the same industry. Finally, at each point
in time, we rank the institutions of the total system from the most to the least systemically
relevant according to each systemic risk measure. We then select the top 10 institutions at each
point in time and calculate the relative weight of each industry within the top 10 over time,
thereby creating an index. More formally, the group of selected institutions at each point in
time is defined as
Skt = {i1,t > ... > in,t > ... > i10,t} (1)
in which in represents an institution ranked from the most to the least systemic (with n = 1→
most systemic) according to the k measure, with k = Granger, ∆CoVaR, DMES. Then, the
index for each systemic risk measure k is obtained as follows
Ikt =

∑10
n=1 1in,t=Bank
10∑10
n=1 1in,t=Insurer
10∑10
n=1 1in,t=Non−Financial
10
(2)
in which 1 is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition (e.g. if in = Bank) is met
and 0 otherwise. Sums are then scaled between 0 and 1. Finally, we group all 3 indexes and
form the total index, which is given by
Itott =

∑
k
∑10
n=1 1in,k,t=Bank
3·10∑
k
∑10
n=1 1in,k,t=Insurer
3·10∑
k
∑10
n=1 1in,k,t=Non−Financial
3·10
(3)
It is worth remarking that the 3 systemic risk measures that we test in the analysis tend to
represent different phenomena and therefore need to be correctly interpreted. The Granger
causality test is a measure that allows us to quantify the degree of connectedness of an insti-
tution vis-a`-vis a system of institutions. By creating a network of pairwise statistical relations,
we can observe not only the degree of interdependence, but also the direction thereof. The
measure is thus a good proxy for an analysis at an aggregate level (for example industry or
other clusters), but its estimation could become cumbersome when the objective is to test the
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individual interconnection with respect to a system of institutions as proxy for the market.9
The ∆CoVaR measures the difference between the CoVaR conditional on the distress of an
institution, i.e. the value-at-risk of the system conditional on an institution being in distress
and the CoVaR conditional on the normal state of the institution. It is therefore able to capture
the marginal contribution of a particular institution to the overall systemic risk. One of the
main advantages of such a measure is its ability to capture the individual contribution of each
institution to the system. Finally, the DMES measures, in a dynamic setting, the expected drop
in equity value of an institution when the system is in distress. It is worth mentioning that
this is not a direct measure of systemic risk, but is highly related to it. The contribution of
Brownlees and Engle (2012) originates from the proposal of Acharya et al. (2010), in which the
marginal expected shortfall of an institution coupled with its leverage, originate the systemic
expected shortfall (SES), i.e. the expected capital shortage of an individual firm conditional
on a substantial reduction in the capitalization of the system. The authors propose a similar
measure called SRISK, which is based on a dynamic estimation of the MES and leverage ratios.
A major advantage of such a contribution is its ability to capture time-varying effects, effects
which are not observable following Acharya et al. (2010). However, both Brownlees and Engle
(2012) and Acharya et al. (2010) estimate such systemic risk measures relying on the estima-
tion of the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and of pre-determined leverage ratios: in order
to avoid additional assumptions that might cast doubts on the reliability of the estimation,10
we simply rely on the directly observable part of the measure, i.e. the DMES, which is sufficient
to provide information on the individual fragility of the individual institution with respect to
market tail events, which in turn have potential systemic implications.11
3.1.1 Data
The data set for the industry analysis consists of equity returns of 60 companies listed in
Europe over a time window of 14 years, from January 1999 to December 2013, which becomes
17 years (i.e. from January 1996 to December 2013) for the Granger causality test due to the
9By market, we essentially mean a broad measure and proxy for the (real) economic activity such as a major
stock index. Throughout the paper, we therefore interchangeably use the terms system and market as (almost)
perfect substitutes.
10However, it is worth noting that Brownlees and Engle (2012) provide a series of robustness checks on the
stability of the parametrization of the SRISK measure.
11Another major issue we face regarding the estimation of the SRISK is the frequency of the accounting data:
since we focus on European insurers, we do not possess sufficiently long quarterly series of balance sheet data.
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lag on the series.12 For each group, we select the top 20 institutions in terms of capitalization
from STOXXr Euro 600 Banks, STOXXr Euro 600 Insurance and STOXXr Europe 600
for banks, insurers and non-financials respectively.13 Table 1 reports the list of the selected
institutions, while table 2 reports the industry distribution of non-financial institutions. Data
were collected both at daily and monthly frequencies. Table 3 reports the summary statistics
of the 3 groups. To calculate the ∆CoVaR, we rely on a set of state variables as proposed in
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), namely i) Market volatility (VIX for Europe), ii) Liquidity
spread (3M Repo - 3M Bubill), iii) change in the short-term interest rate (3M Bubill), iv)
the slope of the yield curve (10Y Bund - 3M Bubill), v) credit spread (BAA 5-7Y Corporate
(Bank of America) - EURO Sovereign 5-7Y (Barclays)), vi) market returns (STOXX EURO
600 All shares). Table 4 reports the summary statistics for the state variables. Finally, tables
5, 6 and 7 report the summary statistics of monthly and daily returns for banks, insurers and
non-financials respectively.
3.2 Systemic Risk Measures and Insurers’ Fundamentals
For the analysis of fundamentals, we investigate the relation between asset and liability
compositions and systemic risk measures. In particular, we focus on items on the balance sheet
rather than on the income statement, i.e. measures of stock rather than flow. This is justified
by the fact that the insurance industry is a liability-driven business which often entails a long-
term horizon in which the ability to maintain outstanding financial promises might change
over time.14 The outstanding stocks, and therefore the underlying past and current capital
allocation decisions, i.e. underwriting decisions and consequent asset allocation, thus have a
profound impact on the dynamics of the value of the institution, especially when sudden changes
in market conditions, such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis, occur.15 Thus, it is worth dissecting
the different components of the insurance balance sheet in order to understand where potential
sources of systemic risk are. In addition, the analysis focuses on the business conducted at
12Data were downloaded from Datastreamr.
13Within each group, companies are ranked according to the yearly average market capitalization over the
14-year time frame. We selected those companies which were continuously listed over the period.
14This is particularly true in the life and health business segment.
15In a public speech, the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi emphasized this point
and stated that ”(...) The models were built on flows, with little or no attention paid to stocks. But it was
precisely from stocks that the irregularities and hence the crisis arose. Non linearities arise on a balance sheet
when capital falls to zero and the agent goes into default (...)“ (Draghi, 2012). For a much broader perspective
on stocks vs. flows, see for instance Borio and Disyatat (2011).
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shareholders’ risk, namely excluding items for which risk is borne by policyholders.16 In this
part of the analysis, we are thus able to test which features drive the contribution of insurers
to systemic risk.
In order to test the relation between relevant balance sheet items and systemic relevance,
we run OLS regressions with yearly fixed effects of the lagged individual insurer balance sheet
characteristics on the individual systemic risk measure.17 We specify a model that includes both
asset and liability based indicators. This model allows on the one hand to separately analyze
the systemic implications stemming from underwriting and investment decision18 and on the
other hand to avoid potential biases, such as omitted variables.
The baseline model for the ith insurer is given by the following:
SRit = β0 +β1 ·Price− to−bookit−1 +β2 ·Leveragei,A/Lt−1 +β3 ·Sizei,A/Lt−1 +
∑
j
βj ·Xij,t−1 + it (4)
in which Price-to-book is the market value to book value ratio, LeverageA is the ratio between
tangible assets and tangible equity and LeverageL the ratio between liabilities and tangible
equity, SizeA is the logarithm of tangible assets and SizeL is the logarithm of liabilities.19
We specify both Leverage and Size in 2 different (but analogous) ways in order to avoid
multicollinearity problems when regressing on the relevant balance sheet items and proxies.
Xj includes a set of balance sheet items and proxies for specific factors which may influence
the systemic risk contribution of an insurance company. These include Concentration, Invest-
ment Quality, Fixed Income Assets, Equity Assets, Cash, Insurance Activities, Total Debt and
Separate Accounts. More specifically, Concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (H-H)
with respect to asset classes of the portfolio’s holdings which broadly captures the degree of
diversification of the portfolio20; Investment Quality is the amount of at least A-rated assets
which proxies the quality of the asset allocation with respect to credit risk21 and Fixed Income
Assets, Equity Assets and Cash are the amount of fixed income, equity and cash assets classes
16This business is usually categorized as unit-linked or separate account business.
17We introduce the lag as to avoid endogeneity issues.
18It is worth noticing how underwriting decisions tend to shape investment decisions consistently with the
typical liability-driven business approach of the insurance industry, but decisions on the asset allocation might
be also influenced by other factors, such as the need to deliver investment performances, and not being limited
to the replication of the liability portfolio.
19Price-to-book, Leverage and Size are usually identified as key drivers of systemic risk in financial institutions,
see for instance Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014).
20The H-H index is a widely applied measure of concentration: it is computed as follows
∑
i x
2
i
(
∑
i xi)
2 . For its
original applications, see Hirschman (1964).
21This typically includes fixed income assets as the rating mainly refers to credit risk.
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respectively. Finally, Insurance Activities is the amount of insurance activities among total
activities, Total Debt is the amount of debt which includes senior debt, i.e. mainly deposits for
banking activities, and subordinated debt, Separate Accounts is the amount of business which
is not at shareholder risk.22
3.2.1 Hypotheses and Expected Contributions
It is worth clarifying beforehand the expectations with respect to the marginal contribution
of single factors on systemic risk. To this purpose, we formulate 2 ex-ante hypotheses: the first
one is the following
H.1) The Systemic Risk contribution of insurers is mainly driven by the liability side, i.e. its
capital structure.
In particular, we expect Insurance Activities as a proxy for traditional insurance business, to
exert a negative contribution to systemic risk, i.e. ∂SR∂ I.A. < 0; by contrast Total Debt is expected
to positively contribute to systemic risk, i.e. ∂SR∂ T.D. > 0: this could be loosely interpreted as
proxy for banking activities, since deposits are classified as senior debt, but also more broadly
as non-insurance activities. Finally, Separate Accounts (or unit-linked business) is expected to
be insignificant as most of the risk connected to such business are transferred to policyholders.
An implication of such hypothesis is that the asset side tends to play a subordinated role
in posing systemic risk in insurance, although its level of diversification and its credit quality
might turn out to be relevant factors since underwriting decisions tend to be replicated in the
asset side.23 More formally, Concentration is a proxy for the degree of diversification of the
asset portfolio. By a micro perspective, a higher degree of diversification could have a positive
impact on the single institution in terms of risk diversification. However, by a macro perspective
a higher degree of diversification could have a negative impact on the overall system due to the
higher degree of interconnectedness among institutions. 24 Hence, as interconnectedness is a
potential source of systemic risk (Billio et al., 2012), we formulate a second hypothesis:
H.2) A higher diversification of investments is associated with a higher contribution to systemic
risk.
22Table 8 reports a detailed overview of the variables used throughout the analyses.
23In other words, (re)insurers focused on traditional insurance activities adopt asset and liability management
strategies through which risks undertaken on the liability side are hedged (replicated) through the asset side.
24An extensive treatment of the argument is provided among others by Das and Uppal (2004), Wagner (2010),
Ibragimov et al. (2011) and Raffestin (2014).
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More specifically we expect Concentration to negatively contribute to the systemic relevance
of an institution, i.e. ∂SR∂ C. < 0. In addition, also Fixed Income Assets, Equity Assets and Cash
might be significant contributors to systemic risk, in particular bonds might be expected to
display a negative sign due to the generally lower degree of risk compared to equity, which in
turn we expect to be a positive contributor and cash can be expected to display a negative sign
as it could be loosely interpreted as a proxy for liquidity.
Finally, Price-to-book, LeverageA/L and SizeA/L are in general positive contributor to sys-
temic risk in financial institutions, although in the insurance context it might not always be the
case.25
3.2.2 Data
For the analysis of fundamentals, we rely on a larger data set of insurers listed in Europe.
We were able to collect both market data and balance sheet data for 61 European insurers
from SNL Financials. Tables 9 and 10 report summary statistics for equity returns of the
insurers and balance sheet variables. Table 11 displays the correlation matrix of balance sheet
variables. Data for balance sheet variables is available from 2005 onwards, therefore the analysis
of fundamentals can only cover the period between 2005 and 2013.
To test the relation between balance sheet composition and systemic risk contributions, we
rely on 2 of the 3 measures that we estimated in the industry analysis, namely the ∆CoVaR
and the DMES. This is due to the fact that while we can estimate these 2 measures using a
representative index, this is no longer possible for the Granger causality test. In fact, for the
purpose of the analysis, it is convenient to measure the marginal effect of each institution vis-a`-
vis the system, which can be proxied through a broad equity index.26 Due to data availability,
we use the FTSE All shares as proxy for the system.27 For the analysis of fundamentals, we
thus focus on the ∆CoVaR and the DMES. To match the yearly frequency of the balance sheet
data, we estimate daily ∆CoVaR and DMES, then take the median of the month and average
through the year.28
25See for instance Bierth et al. (2015).
26A similar approach is proposed in Bierth et al. (2015) and Brunnermeier et al. (2012).
27For the sake of consistency, we would have employed the Euro STOXX total market, but unfortunately the
total return index is only available from 2002 onwards. Therefore, we use the FTSE All shares as a substitute
and proxy for the European market as a whole.
28The systemic risk measures were re-estimated using the FTSE All shares as a system: not all of the 61 insurers
were continuously listed between January 1999 and December 2013, therefore we calculated the measures with
the available time series.
12
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Systemic Risk Measures and Rankings of Systemic Risk Contributions
4.1.1 The Granger causality test (Billio et al., 2012)
Figure 1 reports the evolution over time of the total number of causing (Granger-causal)
significant connections over the total number of possible connections from a single institution
belonging to each group towards its own industry (intra-industry). During the pre-crisis period,
a generalized decrease in the connectivity level can be observed across the 3 groups: particularly
in the period from 1999 to the end of 2004, the level of connectivity goes from roughly 20-25% to
10-15%; starting from 2005 onwards, the level of intra-industry connectivity among banks and
insurers increases rapidly, spiking at 35-40% around the time of Lehman filing for bankruptcy
and the subsequent AIG bailout. For non-financials, although the index signals an increase
of the connectivity level, a Lehamn effect is much less visible. The filing for bankruptcy and
the subsequent AIG bailout thus represent more of a shock to the financial industry than to
the non-financial industry. The aftermath of Lehman in fact signals a clear increase in the
connectivity level among banks: non-financials continue to display relatively lower levels of
connectivity, whereas insurers tend to span halfway between banks and non-financials.
Figure 2 reports the evolution over time of the total number of Granger-causal significant
connections over the total number of possible connections from each group towards other indus-
tries. The upper graph displays the average number of receiving (Granger-causal) connections
for a single institution in each group from other industries. We can observe a clear pre- and
post-Lehman trend which is consistent with the shock to the financial system as recorded in
figure 1: before the filing for bankruptcy of Lehman, financial institutions tended to act as
receivers more than non-financials; after Lehman the opposite occurs, with non-financials being
net receivers. The lower graph displays the number of causing (Granger-causal) connections
for each group from other industries. Clearly, the trend now follows opposite directions, with
financial institutions becoming the net causer after Lehamn: in particular, banks from 2006
up to Lehman play a much stronger role compared to insurers, and the same tendency can
be observed from 2009 to 2012. Once again, we can observe a subordinated role of insurers
compared to banks as a cause of systemic risk, with a consequent role of net receiver played by
non-financials.
Finally, figure 3 reports the evolution over time of the total number of causing and receiving
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(Granger-causal) significant connections over the total number of possible connections from
each group towards the total system. Once again, insurers tend to be subordinated compared
to banks in causing as well as receiving systemic risk: even though a unique trend over time
does not emerge, we can still observe how from 2007 through to 2013, insurers persistently pose
less systemic risk compared to banks, with an increase in this difference from 2009 onwards.
In summary, the outcome provided by the Granger causality test provides a fairly clear
picture over time of receivers and causers of systemic risk: non-financials behave as causers
during tranquil periods and as net receivers during crises, whereas banks appear to be the most
prominent causers of systemic risk in the aftermath of a crisis. In particular, among financial
institutions, insurers display a more ambiguous behavior compared to banks and on average
play a subordinated role compared to banks, especially during the 2007-2009 financial crisis
and its aftermath. This is in line with existing findings for American insurance companies.29
4.1.2 ∆CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011)
Figure 4 reports estimations of the average individual institutions’ ∆CoVaR within its in-
dustry (intra-industry). The figure displays a strong differentiation between financial and non-
financial institutions. Banks and insurers present the lowest values, with the 2 curves almost
perfectly co-moving over the whole time window. Nevertheless, differences between banks and
insurers do exist, especially in the aftermath of the crisis, where banks persistently tend to
register lower values compared to insurers, with differences of up to 1 percentage point around
the European sovereign crisis, i.e. between 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, a striking difference
emerges when comparing non-financials with banks and insurers: with the Granger causality
test, non-financials are consistently less interconnected within themselves and display persis-
tently much higher values.30
Figure 5 reports results for the average individual institutions’ ∆CoVaR towards other indus-
tries: pre-crises periods are clearly dominated by non-financials, whereas during and after the
Lehman bankruptcy, banks and insurers become systemically more relevant, with non-financial
companies still displaying a relatively higher contribution to systemic risk. It is clear that by
changing the composition of the reference system towards which we estimate the measure, effects
differ quite substantially: by considering the marginal effects of an institution towards other
29See, among others, Chen et al. (2014).
30Please note that we consider lower values to be a sign of higher systemic relevance, since the measure
estimates market value losses.
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industries, we can observe the spillover effects that one industry has onto other industries, and
not surprisingly, non-financials had a higher influence on banks and insurers before the financial
crisis occurred. This is mainly due to the exposure of the financial sector towards all other
sectors rather than vice-versa.31 This once again provides evidence on the financial nature of
the crisis.
Finally, figure 6 reports the results of the average individual institutions’ ∆CoVaR towards
the total system. Here, it is worth noting that before the bankruptcy of Lehman, financials and
non-financials display small differences in values, whereas after the crisis, the contribution to
systemic risk of financial institutions increases dramatically, with banks once more dominating
insurers in terms of marginal contribution. Even though the differences appear modest, we
should stress the fact that the measure is estimated on daily returns and averaged through many
institutions, therefore the average marginal contribution of banks after 2008 can be estimated
as being roughly 20% higher compared to insurers, which makes it considerably higher.
In summary, ∆CoVaR provides a fairly clear indication of the behavior of financial and
non-financial institutions, which is in line with the Granger causality test. Furthermore, if we
consider the estimations of the total system to be more representative of the role of each group
in posing systemic risk, insurers again tend to play a subordinated role compared to banks.
4.1.3 DMES (Brownlees and Engle, 2012)
Figure 7 reports the results for the average marginal contribution of the individual institution
within its industry (intra-industry). The pattern of each group is comparable with the one
obtained with the other 2 measures, and in particular with the ∆CoVaR. The 2 measures
present the same peaks during the financial crises and report a higher level of systemic riskiness
after the crises compared to the pre-crises period. Differences from the previous measures can
be found in the spikes at the end of 2001 and 2003 reported by DMES: these spikes are mainly
driven by the insurance industry and can be traced back to industry-specific events such as 9/11
and severe natural catastrophes occurring in Europe in 2003. Consistent with the design of the
measure, these peaks are well captured by DMES due to its focus on tails of the distributions,
i.e. severe events. In general, financial institutions report lower average DMES values than
non-financial institutions, with some differences between banks and insurers depending on the
period: in the aftermath of the crises, banks pose more risk than insurers.
31In the public debate, this is sometimes referred to as “Wall Street” vs “Main Street”.
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Figure 8 reports results for the average marginal contribution of the individual institution
towards other industries: on the one hand, the measure indicates once more the distinction
between financial and non-financial institutions, with the latter being overall less exposed to
the financial sector; on the other hand, banks and insurers appear to be substantially equal in
terms of contribution, with banks dominating in the aftermath of Lehman.
Finally, figure 9 reports the results for the average marginal contribution of the individual
institution towards the total system. There is no significant difference from the results presented
in both the Granger causality test and in the ∆CoVaR, which in turn confirms our results.
In summary, DMES confirms the outcome of the 2 other measures, attributing the higher
systemic relevance to financial institutions, among which insurers prevail before Lehman and
banks in its aftermath.
4.1.4 Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)
We also report the average results towards the total system for those insurers labeled as SIFIs:
this distinction is particularly relevant, since regulators indicated some common characteristics
among these institutions which should make them more systemically relevant compared to the
median insurer. It is thus worth analyzing their individual behavior vis-a`-vis the total system.
Figure 10 shows a higher average degree of causality compared to the full insurance group with
significant peaks which can be observed during the Lehman bankruptcy. In general, we can
observe that despite a higher causality compared to non-SIFIs, this sub-group of institutions
still tends to play a minor role compared to banks in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis.
Figure 11 reports a widespread increase of systemic contribution of SIFI insurers measured
by ∆CoVaR in comparison to the full insurance sample and even compared to banks. The
contribution towards the total system is the highest among the 3 groups throughout the period.
Finally, figure 12 reports the result for the DMES: among the 3 measures, the DMES displays the
smallest differences between SIFI insurers and non-SIFI insurers, with the period following the
Lehman bankruptcy recording the systemic contribution of SIFIs as being significantly inferior
to the contribution of banks.
4.1.5 Rankings
In order to provide a straightforward representation of the systemic relevance of the 3 groups
according to the 3 measures, we display in figure 13 the 10 most systemically relevant institutions
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grouped by industry at each point in time. The Granger causality test and the ∆CoVaR
alternatively rank banks during crises and non-financials during tranquil periods as the most
systemically relevant companies with a key distinction: banks are always present throughout the
period, whereas non-financials disappear after the Lehman crisis. Insurers, despite always being
present in the top 10 sub-group throughout the period, still play a subordinated role compared
to banks. The DMES attributes a predominant role to insurance companies before the Lehman
bankruptcy and to banks afterwards. The measure associates to non-financials an ancillary
role only in tranquil periods. The systemic relevance of the 3 groups is finally summarized
into a synthetic indicator that displays at each point in time the industry composition of the
top 10 most systemic institutions according to the 3 measures.32 The index clearly shows that
non-financials dominate the index before Lehman, whereas banks dominate it thereafter. In
contrast, insurers always tend to play a subordinated role both before and after the Legman
bankruptcy.
In conclusion, we can summarize our findings as follows: i) the 3 measures make a clear
distinction between financial and non-financial institutions; ii) among financial institutions,
banks dominate insurers in terms of contribution to systemic risk in the aftermath of the
financial crises, with insurers nevertheless displaying a persistent contribution to systemic risk
over time; iii) there is no clear-cut evidence on higher systemic relevance of SIFI insurers; iv)
trends in systemic risk contributions are time-dependent and tend to change rapidly, making
the choice of the time span of analysis a crucial variable. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that
the 3 measures were developed to capture different features of the systemic risk contribution
of institutions, therefore inconsistencies over time should not be seen as lack of accuracy, but
rather as emphasis on different factors that contribute to systemic risk.
In the next section, we analyze the determinants behind the systemic contribution of insur-
ers: we attempt to shed further light on which activities within the insurance industry make
some insurers more systemic than others. To do so and to overcome sample biases, particularly
with respect to the choice of the time window to analyze, we collect a broader sample of data
on European insurers over a longer period of time (than previously done in the literature).
32See equation (3).
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4.2 Systemic Risk Measures and Insurers’ Fundamentals
Table 12 reports the results of the panel regressions run on the ∆CoVaR and on the DMES.33
The model described in equation (4), has 2 specifications: an asset oriented specification and a
liability oriented specification, which differ for the definition of Leverage and Size. In addition,
both specifications are tested on 3 different panels, namely i) Full Sample, ii) Sample without
Reinsurers and iii) Sample without Reinsurers and SIFIs. We opt for 2 different specifications
in order to avoid multicollinearity issues as some of the regressors present a relatively high
level of correlation.34 Finally, the 3 different panels aim to exclude potential biases induced by
institutions with specific characteristics, such as reinsurers and SIFIs compared to the median
insurer.
The results on the Full Sample of both the ∆CoVaR and the DMES suggest a statistically
and economic significant positive contribution of Size, both if computed as total assets or total
liabilities, although the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively moderate. By contrast, both
Price-to-book and Leverage seem to be statistically significant when regressed on the ∆CoVaR,
whereas they lose significance when regressed on the DMES. However the economic significance,
both in terms of sign and magnitude suggest a controversial and minor effect on systemic risk, in
line with the findings of Bierth et al. (2015). A potential interpretation could be that Leverage
as measured among others in banking, does not properly fit insurers as measure of financial
fragility, whereas Price-to-book could be a better indicator at a higher frequency, e.g. quarterly
frequency, as it tends to reflect market sentiment in the relatively shorter term.
Striking results come from the effects of Concentration: in line with our second hypothesis
(H.2) the degree of diversification of the asset allocation have a very strong statistically and
economic significant negative impact on the systemic risk contribution of insurers, which implies
that the more diversified a portfolio of assets is, the higher the propensity to pose systemic risk.
Results remain strong under the 2 different specifications and the 2 different systemic risk
measures. This is consistent with the theoretical argument outlaid among others by Das and
Uppal (2004), Wagner (2010), Ibragimov et al. (2011) and Raffestin (2014), which has so far
lacked empirical evidence. Also the Investment Quality of the asset portfolio seems to atter
for the DMES, even though its statistical and economic significance appear rather small. In
33In order to ease the interpretation of coefficients, ∆CoVaR and DMES values are reported with inverted
signs ad scaled by 100, e.g. a higher systemic relevance is associated with a higher (positive) value displayed by
the 2 measures.
34Table 11 reports the correlations among regressors.
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addition, the relative positions taken in major asset classes such as Fixed Income Assets and
Cash appear to be statistically significant only for a sub-set of the specifications, although
significance becomes weaker for the DMES, thereby highlighting potential biases in the sample.
Also, the sign of the coefficients is always positive, thus making the economic interpretation
difficult as both assets classes should (theoretically) be negatively linked to systemic risk. By
contrast Equity Assets does not display statistical significance.
Insurance Activities display a strong economic and statistically significant coefficient across
the 2 specifications and the 2 measures: as we per our conjecture (H.1), there exists a strong
negative relation between the amount of insurance activities held in portfolio (with respect to
all activities of the insurer) and the systemic risk contribution of the insurer. This evidence
is consistent with the idea expressed in Cummins and Weiss (2014) that non-core activities
are potentially more systemic than the traditional insurance activities, and in line with the
evidence from U.S. insurers provided by Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014), in which non-policy
holders’ activities did cause systemic risk during the financial crisis.
Total Debt displays a statistically significant coefficient only for the DMES: the economic
significance is robust and suggests that insurers with a capital structure more exposed to non
policy holders’ liabilities or more in general exposed to non-insurance (banking) activities, tend
to pose more systemic risk. Finally, Separate Accounts appear to be weakly statistically sig-
nificant in only one specification, i.e. asset oriented specification, of the ∆CoVaR and of the
DMES, whereas they display statistically insignificant coefficients if specified with liability ori-
ented variables.
Moving from the Full Sample to Sample without Reinsurers we note how for the ∆CoVaR,
Fixed Income Assets becomes insignificant, whereas Cash remains unchanged. For the DMES we
note how both Concentration and Investment Quality increase their significance, both economic
and statistical. By contrast Total Debt loses some statistical significance, although its p value
is still below 10%. Price-to-book, Leverage and Size remain mainly unchanged. Finally, moving
to the reduced and potentially more robust sample, as it excludes potential biases both from
reinsurers and SIFIs, we observe that the key drivers across the different specifications and
for both measures are indeed Concentration, Insurance Activities and Total Debt. All other
variables lose significance, except for few outliers. Such result strongly confirms that net of
reinsurers and SIFIs, i.e. mostly big insurance groups, the key drivers of systemic risk in
insurance are non-insurance activities and the level of diversification of its asset portfolio.
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To summarize, we can conclude that i) Insurance Activities are a strongly economic and
statistically significant factor for systemic risk in insurance, as well as Total Debt, which together
strongly determine the capital structure of firms, ii) Concentration, i.e. diversification, if it can
be considered optimal at single institution level, it may turn out to be deleterious at an aggregate
(systemic) level. In addition we confirm that Size does matter, whereas Leverage appears to be
a potentially misleading measure in insurance companies.
4.2.1 Robustness of Results
In addition to the robustness check that we conducted by testing the different specifications
across 3 different panels we conduct a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis to check for po-
tential endogeneity issues.35 Similar to Brunnermeier et al. (2012), we test the robustness of our
findings around Lehman’s filing for bankruptcy and subsequent AIG bailout.36 Since Lehman’s
failure came as an exogenous shock, it represents a good candidate for a natural experiment.37
We adopt the following strategy for the DiD analysis: we run regressions using the same
specifications as in equation (4) and we test single variables around the Lehman shock, i.e.
systemic risk contribution in 2007 vs 2008, balance sheet items and proxies in 2006 vs 2007. In
particular, we construct dummy variables for each of the relevant variable, i.e. Concentration,
Investment Quality, Fixed Income Assets, Equity Assets, Cash, Insurance Activities, Total Debt
and Separate Accounts.38 The model is the following:
SRi =β0 + β1 · Price− to− booki + β2 · Leveragei,A/L + β3 · Sizei,A/L +
∑
j 6=z
βj ·Xij+ (5)
δ0 · d.shock + δ1 · d.Xz + δ̂ · d.shock · d.Xz + i (6)
in which the d.shock is a dummy variable which takes value 0 for 2007 and value 1 for 2008 (pre-
and post-shock period) and the d.Xz is a dummy that represents the control (or non-treated
group) and the treatment group respectively. We specify 8 treatment groups, 1 for each relevant
35In the panel regressions we use a time lag between dependent and independent variables: theoretically such
temporal mis-match should shelter our analysis from endogeneity or reverse causality issues.
36For further details on the applied DiD methodology, see, for instance, Meyer (1995) and Angrist and Krueger
(1999). For a more didactic contribution, see Wooldridge (2010).
37AIG was bailed out by the U.S. Government a day after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing.
38We neglect Price-to-book, Leverage and Size not because we neglect their importance, but because they have
been substantially analyzed in previous work, see for instance Brunnermeier et al. (2012) for banks and (Bierth
et al., 2015) for insurers.
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variable: we divide the observations into 2 groups, above and below the median and assign value
0 and 1 depending on the expected sign of the variable. Table 13 provides an overview of the
treatment variables.
Tables 14 - 17 report the results of the DiD around the Lehman bankruptcy and AIG bailout:
the coefficient of interest is of course the interaction term (δ̂) between the shock dummy and
the control group. The striking result of such robustness check is that, Insurance Activities,
Total Debt and Separate Accounts appear to be statistically and economically significant deter-
minants of systemic risk, although not uniformly for the 2 measures: in fact, Separate Accounts
are statistically insignificant for the ∆CoVaR. This confirms our hypothesis that the capital
structure, i.e. the liability side, is the key driver of systemic risk in insurance. By contrast
Concentration does not display significant coefficients: however, this shall not be taken as a
rejection in toto, rather it deserves further investigation, since Concentration is just a proxy and
by definition it is an imperfect measure and therefore, measurement errors might be a potential
explanation for its insignificance.
5 Conclusion
In the present paper, we propose an analysis of the role of the insurance industry in posing
systemic risk and the determinants therein. We divide the analysis into 2 parts: first, we
conduct an aggregated industry analysis based on 3 measures of systemic risk on 3 different
groups. By doing so, we aim to test the relative systemic risk contribution of the insurance
industry vis-a`-vis other industries. In the second part of the analysis, we investigate what are
the potential determinants of systemic risk within the insurance industry by focusing on the
asset and liability composition of insurers.
Our evidence suggests that financial institutions tend to cause more systemic risk than non-
financial institutions; among financial institutions, banks pose more systemic risk than insurers,
especially after the Lehman bankruptcy. Insurers do cause systemic risk, especially when they
engage in non-insurance activities, e.g. banking activities. Furthermore, we find that systemic
risk in the insurance industry is mainly driven by the liability side, i.e. the capital structure
rather than the asset side: however, on the asset side we find that the level of diversification is
also a strong determinant of systemic risk, although further investigation is needed. In addition,
traditional variables associated with systemic risk in financial institutions, such as size is of
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importance, whereas price-to-book and leverage seem to play a counterintuitive role. This is
however in line with previous findings, which confirm for instance that leverage in insurance is
fundamentally different compared to leverage in banking. Results are robust to a set of different
specifications, different panels and different econometric methods. Finally, the choice of the time
span should shelter the analysis from biases stemming from sample (time-dependency) selection.
In conclusion, we provide new evidence on the role of insurers in posing systemic risk, in
particular on the role of insurance activities compared to non-insurance activities. Also, we are
among the first to provide empirical evidence on the role of diversification in posing systemic
risk, which should be further analyzed in future research. Moreover, we are the first to use
a European set of companies and to use variables of stock rather than flow : the latter is
particularly relevant to show how the stock of the outstanding business drives systemic risk
contribution in the insurance industry.
Thus, our research has the potential to provide a significant contribution to shedding ad-
ditional light on the debate on systemic risk in the insurance industry as well as insightful
indications on how to assess the systemic relevance of insurance companies. This is particularly
relevant in the light of the ongoing discussion on the role of SIFIs and on the specific regulations
they might be subjected in the future. Furthermore, the present paper could serve as a basis for
a theoretical treatment of the systemic risk contribution of the insurance industry, and thereby
contribute to deepening the understanding of the underlying economic forces driving systemic
risk.
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A Appendix
A.1 Systemic Risk Measures
A.1.1 The Granger causality test (Billio et al., 2012)
We measure the systemic importance of an institution in terms of the total number of statis-
tically significant pairwise connections based on linear Granger causality tests. This approach
allows us to infer when equity price movements of an institution influence price movements of
another institution over a given period of time. The Granger causality test measures the ability
of 2 time series to forecast each other. We can write the system of equations as follows
yit+1 = α
iyit + β
ijyjt + 
i
t+1 (7)
yjt+1 = α
jyjt + β
jiyit + 
j
t+1 (8)
in which coefficients αi, βij , αj , βji are estimated via linear regression and in which time series
j is said to “Granger-cause” times series i if lagged values of j contain statistically significant
information that helps in predicting i.
The causality indicator is defined as follow:
j → i =

1, if j Granger causes i
0, otherwise
0, for j → j
(9)
Equation (9) allows us to calculate a series of indexes based on the total number of significant
relations among institutions at a specific point in time.39The Degree of Granger Causality thus
represents the fraction of statistically significant relationships over the total number of possible
connections among the full sample,
DGC =
1
N(N − 1)
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(j → i) (10)
Moreover, we can differentiate between causing and receiving connections which are defined
39The level of significance K is set at 0.05.
23
as follows
Out : (j → S)|DGC≥K = 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
(j → i)|DGC≥K (11)
In : (S → j)|DGC≥K = 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
(i→ j)|DGC≥K (12)
We then distinguish between 3 cases:
1) intra-industry :
(j → ind−j)|DGC≥K = 1
(N − 1)
∑
i 6=j
(j → ind−j)|DGC≥K (13)
(ind−j → j)|DGC≥K = 1
(N − 1)
∑
j 6=i
(ind−j → j)|DGC≥K (14)
2) other industries:
(
j → S−ind
)
|DGC≥K = 1
2N
∑
i 6=j
(j → S−ind)|DGC≥K (15)
(
S−ind → j
)
|DGC≥K = 1
2N
∑
i 6=j
(S−ind → j)|DGC≥K (16)
3) total system:
(j → S−j)|DGC≥K 1
3N − 1
∑
i 6=j
(j → S−j)|DGC≥K (17)
(S−j → j)|DGC≥K 1
3N − 1
∑
i 6=j
(S−j → j)|DGC≥K . (18)
Each index represents the contribution of each individual institution. We then calculate
industry averages by summing the total number of institutions’ connections across each
industry group.
A.1.2 ∆CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011)
The measure extends the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) designed for individual institutions
to the system as a whole. The CoVaR represent the VaR of a system conditional on institu-
tions being in distress. The systemic contribution of an individual institution to the system is
computed as the difference between the CoVaR of the institution in distress and the CoVaR
in the median state, hence ∆CoVaR. Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we calculate
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the ∆CoVaR using quantile regressions by setting the median state at the 50 percentile and
the distress situation at the 95 percentile. We also include in the regressions a set of 6 state
variables Mt−1, namely market volatility, liquidity spread, changes in the short-term interest
rates, the slope of the yield curve, credit spreads and total equity returns, using 1 week lag.
Estimations are based on the following equations
Xit = α
i + γiMt−1 + εit (19)
XSt = α
S|i + βS|iXit + γ
S|iMt−1 + ε
S|i
t (20)
where i represents the individual institution and S is the index representing the set of institu-
tions under consideration. The predicted value from the regressions are then plugged into the
following equation to obtain both the VaR of the individual institution and consequently the
CoVaR
V aRit(q) = αˆ
i
q + γˆ
i
qMt−1 (21)
CoV aRit(q) = αˆ
S|i + βˆS|iV aRit(q) + γˆ
S|iMt−1. (22)
Finally, the contribution of each institution to the system is calculated as follows:
∆CoV aRit(q) = CoV aR
i
t(5%)− CoV aRit(50%) = βˆS|i(V aRit(5%)− V aRit(50%)) (23)
We then distinguish between 3 cases:
1) intra-industry :
XSt =
∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1 · rjt∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1
(24)
with w=market capitalization, r= return, j= i’s industry group,
∆CoV aR
intra-industry|i
t =
1
N
N∑
i
Φ−1(0.5)∆CoV aRintra-industry|it→t+h (25)
where t→ t+ h indicates 1 calendar month of daily ∆CoVaR.
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2) other industries:
XSt =
∑
j w
j
t−1 · rjt∑
j w
j
t−1
(26)
with w=market capitalization, r= return, j= excluding i’s industry group,
∆CoV aR
other industries|i
t =
1
N
N∑
i
Φ−1(0.5)∆CoV aRother industries|it→t+h (27)
where t→ t+ h indicates 1 calendar month of daily ∆CoVaR.
3) total system:
XSt =
∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1 · rjt∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1
(28)
with w=market capitalization, r= return, j= total system,
∆CoV aR
total system|i
t =
1
N
N∑
i
Φ−1(0.5)∆CoV aRtotal system|it→t+h (29)
where t→ t+ h indicates 1 calendar month of daily ∆CoVaR.
Where N represents the number of institutions for each of the 3 groups. In order to avoid
correlation biases, i.e. under case 1) and 3), we always exclude institution i from the index
representing the reference group.
A.1.3 DMES (Brownlees and Engle, 2012)
The measure is based on the expected loss conditional to a distressed situation (eg. returns
being less than a certain quantile): Brownlees and Engle (2012) extend the measure proposed by
(Acharya et al., 2010) by introducing a dynamic model characterized by time varying volatility
and correlation as well a nonlinear tail dependence. The market model is defined as follows
rmt = σmtmt
rit = σitρitmt + σit
√
1− ρ2itξit (30)
(mt, ξit) ∼ F
26
where ri is the market return of the i
th institution and σit is its conditional standard deviation,
rm is the market return of the system considered and σmt is its conditional standard deviation,
 and ξ are the shocks that drive the system and ρit is the conditional correlation between i
and m. The one period ahead DMES can be expressed as follows
DMES1it−1(C) = σitρitEt−1(mt|mt <
C
σmt
) + σit
√
1− ρ2itEt−1(ξit|mt <
C
σmt
) (31)
where C is the conditioning systemic event which we assume to be equal to the 95th percentile
of the total period market return, i.e. C = Φ−1(0.95)rm.40 The conditional standard deviations
and the conditional correlation are estimated by means of a TARCH and a DCC model respec-
tively.41 The tail expectations Et−1(mt|mt < C
σmt
) and Et−1(ξit|mt < C
σmt
) are calculated by
means of a non-parametric kernel estimator and are given by the following equations
Eˆh(mt|mt < k) =
∑n
i=1 mtKh(mt − k)
(npˆh)
(32)
Eˆh(ξit|mt < k) =
∑n
i=1 ξitKh(mt − k)
(npˆh)
(33)
with
pˆh =
∑n
i=1Kh(mt − k)
n
We then distinguish between 3 cases:
1) intra-industry :
rmt =
∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1 · rjt∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1
(34)
with w=market capitalization, r= return, j= i’s industry group,
DMES
intra-industry|i
t =
1
N
N∑
i
Φ−1(0.5)DMESintra-industry|it→t+h (35)
where t→ t+ h indicates 1 calendar month of daily DMES.
40The choice over the V aR0.95 of the market allows for a more direct comparison with the estimations of the
∆CoVaR.
41For further mathematical details, see Brownlees and Engle (2012).
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2) other industries:
rmt =
∑
j w
j
t−1 · rjt∑
j w
j
t−1
(36)
with w=market capitalization, r= return, j= excluding i’s industry group,
DMES
other industries|i
t =
1
N
N∑
i
Φ−1(0.5)DMESother industries|it→t+h (37)
where t→ t+ h indicates 1 calendar month of daily DMES.
3) total system:
rmt =
∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1 · rjt∑
j 6=iw
j
t−1
(38)
with w=market capitalization, r= return, j= total system,
DMES
total system|i
t =
1
N
N∑
i
Φ−1(0.5)DMEStotal system|it→t+h (39)
where t→ t+ h indicates 1 calendar month of daily DMES.
Where N represents the number of institutions for each of the 3 groups. In order to avoid
correlation biases, i.e. under case 1) and 3), we always exclude institution i from the index
representing the reference group.
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B Tables
Table 1: Institutions: list of the institutions included in the 3 groups
Banks
Name Ticker Country
HSBC HSBA UK
BANCO SANTANDER E:SCH ES
UBS S:UBSN CH
BNP PARIBAS F:BNP FR
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP LLOY UK
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND RBS UK
BARCLAYS BARC UK
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP S:CSGN CH
BBV. ARGENTARIA E:BBVA ES
DEUTSCHE BANK D:DBKX DE
UNICREDIT I:UCG IT
SOCIETE GENERALE F:SGE FR
STANDARD CHARTERED STAN UK
INTESA SANPAOLO I:ISP IT
NORDEA BANK W:NDA SE
KBC B:KB BE
DANSKE BANK DK:DAB DK
COMMERZBANK D:CBKX DE
SVENSKA HANDBKN. W:SVK SE
SEB W:SEA SE
Insurers
ALLIANZ D:ALV DE
PRUDENTIAL PRU UK
AXA F:MIDI FR
ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP S:ZURN CH
MUNICH RE D:MUV2 DE
SWISS RE S:SREN CH
ING H:ING NL
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI I:G IT
SAMPO M:SAMA FI
LEGAL & GENERAL LGEN UK
AVIVA AV. UK
AEGON H:AGN ND
MAPFRE E:MAP ES
HANNOVER RE D:HNR1 DE
AGEAS B:AGS BE
RSA INSURANCE GROUP RSA UK
VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP O:WNST AT
SCOR SE F:SCO FR
SWISS LIFE S:SLHN CH
BAˆLOISE S:BALN CH
Non-Financials
BRITISH PETROLEUM BP. UK
VODAFONE VOD UK
NOVARTIS S:NOVN CH
NESTLE S:NESN CH
GLAXOSMITHKLINE GSK UK
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL H:RDSA UK
TOTAL F:TAL FR
ROCHE S:ROG CH
ENI I:ENI IT
TELEFONICA E:TEF ES
SANOFI F:SQ@F FR
NOKIA M:NOK1 FI
SIEMENS D:SIEX DE
ASTRAZENECA AZN UK
L’OREAL F:OR@F FR
E ON D:EONX DE
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO BATS UK
RIO TINTO RIO UK
LVMH F:LVMH FR
DIAGEO DGE UK
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Table 2: Non-Financial institutions: list of the Non-Financial institutions included in the
analysis classified according to GICI classification.
Name Sector Industry Group
BRITISH PETROLEUM Energy Energy
VODAFONE Telecommunication Telecommunication
NOVARTIS Health Care Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
NESTLE Consumer Staples Food & staples retailing
GLAXOSMITHKLINE Health Care Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL Energy Energy
TOTAL Energy Energy
ROCHE Health Care Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
ENI Energy Energy
TELEFONICA Telecommunication Telecommunication
SANOFI Health Care Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
NOKIA Information technology Technology hardware & Equipment
SIEMENS Industrials Capital Goods
ASTRAZENECA Health Care Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
L’OREAL Consumer Staples Households and Personal Products
E ON Utilities Utilities
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO Consumer Staples House Beverage & Tobacco
RIO TINTO Materials Materials
LVMH Consumer Staples Households & Personal Products
DIAGEO Consumer Staples Food & staples retailing
Table 3: Total Return Indexes: descriptive statistics of the Total Return Indexes of the 60
institutions on the time period between January 1996 to December 2013. The upper part
reports values at monthly frequency, whereas the lower part reports values at daily frequency.
Monthly Data # Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
Banks 20 4,319 0.0048 0.0119 0.1189 -1.2447 0.6602
Non-Financial 20 4,320 0.0086 0.0125 0.0808 -0.6628 0.5099
Insurers 20 4,304 0.0046 0.0117 0.1137 -2.0293 0.6745
Full Sample 60 12,943 0.0060 0.0121 0.1058 -2.0293 0.6745
Daily Data # Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
Banks 20 92,160 0.0002 0.0000 0.0256 -1.0957 0.5495
Non-Financial 20 92,160 0.0004 0.0000 0.0192 -0.4578 0.3226
Insurers 20 92,160 0.0002 0.0000 0.0245 -1.4949 0.3022
Full Sample 60 276,480 0.0003 0.0000 0.0232 -1.4949 0.5495
Table 4: State variables: descriptive statistics of daily data observed on the period between
January 1999 to December 2013.
Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
VIX 4,608 -0.0001 -0.0020 0.0614 -0.3506 0.4960
3M Repo-3M Bubill 4,608 -0.0167 -0.0091 0.6118 -2.0781 2.8463
3M Bubill 4,608 -0.0004 0.0000 0.1037 -1.3863 1.9459
10Y Bund - 3M Bubill 4,608 0.0145 0.0147 0.0076 -0.0022 0.0324
BAA 5-7Y Corp. - Euro Sov. 5-7Y 4,608 0.0118 0.0093 0.0075 -0.0080 0.0358
STOXX Euro 600 All shares 4,608 0.0002 0.0007 0.0124 -0.0793 0.0941
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Table 5: Banks: log returns are observed both at a) monthly frequency and b) daily frequency.
Observation period between January 1996 to December 2013.
a) Name Ticker Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
HSBC HSBA 216 0.0074 0.0086 0.0850 -0.3051 0.3178
BANCO SANTANDER E:SCH 216 0.0075 0.0133 0.1051 -0.5183 0.3095
UBS S:UBSN 216 0.0008 0.0047 0.1022 -0.4722 0.2654
BNP PARIBAS F:BNP 216 0.0086 0.0092 0.1087 -0.4946 0.3052
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP LLOY 215 -0.0001 0.0087 0.1375 -1.0936 0.5410
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND RBS 216 -0.0048 0.0104 0.1631 -1.2447 0.4344
BARCLAYS BARC 216 0.0051 0.0196 0.1395 -0.8081 0.6393
CREDIT SUISSE S:CSGN 216 0.0020 0.0140 0.1152 -0.6667 0.2333
BBV. ARGENTARIA E:BBVA 216 0.0081 0.0155 0.1084 -0.5886 0.3150
DEUTSCHE BANK D:DBKX 216 0.0023 0.0098 0.1206 -0.6229 0.4333
UNICREDIT I:UCG 216 0.0023 0.0052 0.1215 -0.4667 0.3338
SOCIETE GENERALE F:SGE 216 0.0060 0.0130 0.1342 -0.6053 0.2943
STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 216 0.0075 0.0125 0.1104 -0.4134 0.4616
INTESA SANPAOLO I:ISP 216 0.0060 0.0133 0.1214 -0.4655 0.6602
NORDEA BANK W:NDA 216 0.0121 0.0173 0.0859 -0.2902 0.2820
KBC GROUP B:KB 216 0.0048 0.0194 0.1530 -1.1424 0.6334
DANSKE BANK DK:DAB 216 0.0080 0.0134 0.0987 -0.5550 0.4769
COMMERZBANK D:CBKX 216 -0.0088 -0.0027 0.1465 -0.7785 0.5445
SVENSKA HANDBKN. W:SVK 216 0.0122 0.0115 0.0703 -0.2447 0.2031
SEB W:SEA 216 0.0089 0.0184 0.1037 -0.4589 0.3787
b) Name Ticker Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
HSBC HSBA 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0187 -0.2080 0.1442
BANCO SANTANDER E:SCH 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0225 -0.1603 0.2088
UBS S:UBSN 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0236 -0.1889 0.2751
BNP PARIBAS F:BNP 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0253 -0.1893 0.1898
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP LLOY 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 -0.4148 0.4078
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND RBS 4,608 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0340 -1.0957 0.3050
BARCLAYS BARC 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0292 -0.2856 0.5495
CREDIT SUISSE S:CSGN 4,608 0.0001 0.0000 0.0252 -0.1767 0.2461
BBV.ARGENTARIA E:BBVA 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0219 -0.1454 0.1991
DEUTSCHE BANK D:DBKX 4,608 0.0001 0.0001 0.0252 -0.1753 0.2124
UNICREDIT I:UCG 4,608 0.0001 0.0000 0.0264 -0.1896 0.1901
SOCIETE GENERALE F:SGE 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0272 -0.1771 0.2143
STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0252 -0.1795 0.2624
INTESA SANPAOLO I:ISP 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0265 -0.1846 0.1796
NORDEA BANK W:NDA 4,608 0.0006 0.0000 0.0219 -0.1221 0.1492
KBC GROUP B:KB 4,608 0.0002 0.0000 0.0301 -0.2866 0.4048
DANSKE BANK DK:DAB 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0201 -0.1719 0.1398
COMMERZBANK D:CBKX 4,608 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0285 -0.2746 0.2048
SVENSKA HANDBKN. W:SVK 4,608 0.0006 0.0000 0.0186 -0.1074 0.1329
SEB W:SEA 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0250 -0.2231 0.2322
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Table 6: Insurers: log returns are observed both at a) monthly frequency and b) daily
frequency. Observation period between January 1996 to December 2013.
a) Name Ticker Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
ALLIANZ D:ALV 216 0.0019 0.0119 0.1049 -0.4538 0.4230
PRUDENTIAL PRU 216 0.0085 0.0214 0.1073 -0.5433 0.4310
AXA F:MIDI 216 0.0055 0.0138 0.1214 -0.6390 0.3478
ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP S:ZURN 216 0.0024 0.0115 0.1113 -0.7533 0.2935
MUNICH RE D:MUV2 214 0.0057 0.0106 0.0884 -0.3837 0.3084
SWISS RE S:SREN 216 0.0031 0.0158 0.1160 -0.8553 0.4279
ING GROEP H:ING 216 0.0036 0.0118 0.1310 -0.7791 0.3262
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI I:G 216 0.0019 0.0080 0.0886 -0.4041 0.2532
SAMPO M:SAMA 216 0.0183 0.0196 0.0892 -0.4501 0.2562
LEGAL & GENERAL LGEN 216 0.0094 0.0187 0.1004 -0.5431 0.2776
AVIVA AV. 216 0.0029 0.0098 0.1082 -0.5951 0.3514
AEGON H:AGN 216 0.0018 0.0181 0.1319 -0.5931 0.6236
MAPFRE E:MAP 216 0.0065 0.0096 0.0957 -0.4189 0.2777
HANNOVER RE D:HNR1 202 0.0100 0.0140 0.0999 -0.6683 0.3550
AGEAS B:AGS 216 -0.0022 0.0132 0.1844 -2.0293 0.6745
RSA INSURANCE GROUP RSA 216 -0.0007 0.0077 0.1037 -0.5306 0.2485
VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP O:WNST 216 0.0077 0.0008 0.0885 -0.6419 0.4381
SCOR SE F:SCO 216 -0.0007 0.0131 0.1114 -0.6743 0.3231
SWISS LIFE S:SLHN 216 -0.0005 0.0104 0.1456 -0.7104 0.6159
BAˆLOISE S:BALN 216 0.0070 0.0157 0.0967 -0.4777 0.2488
b) Name Ticker Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
ALLIANZ D:ALV 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0227 -0.1568 0.1781
PRUDENTIAL PRU 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0262 -0.2231 0.2107
AXA F:MIDI 4,608 0.0002 0.0005 0.0262 -0.2035 0.1978
ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP S:ZURN 4,608 0.0001 0.0000 0.0229 -0.2257 0.1920
MUNICH RE D:MUV2 4,608 0.0002 0.0000 0.0212 -0.1719 0.1653
SWISS RE S:SREN 4,608 0.0002 0.0000 0.0230 -0.3292 0.1957
ING GROEP H:ING 4,608 0.0002 0.0006 0.0297 -0.3213 0.2565
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI I:G 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0182 -0.1612 0.1739
SAMPO M:SAMA 4,608 0.0009 0.0000 0.0206 -0.1823 0.1367
LEGAL & GENERAL LGEN 4,608 0.0005 0.0000 0.0252 -0.3408 0.2430
AVIVA AV. 4,608 0.0002 0.0000 0.0259 -0.4060 0.2239
AEGON H:AGN 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0289 -0.2768 0.3022
MAPFRE E:MAP 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0222 -0.1508 0.1618
HANNOVER RE D:HNR1 4,608 0.0005 0.0000 0.0218 -0.1989 0.1538
AGEAS B:AGS 4,608 0.0001 0.0005 0.0353 -1.4949 0.2589
RSA INSURANCE GROUP RSA 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0238 -0.2426 0.1425
VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP O:WNST 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0179 -0.1974 0.1529
SCOR SE F:SCO 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0257 -0.3622 0.1907
SWISS LIFE S:SLHN 4,608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0248 -0.2240 0.1877
BAˆLOISE S:BALN 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0203 -0.1662 0.1891
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Table 7: Non-Financials: log returns are observed both at a) monthly frequency and b) daily
frequency. Observation period between January 1996 to December 2013.
a) Name Ticker Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
BRITISH PETROLEUM BP. 216 0.0058 0.0110 0.0742 -0.3714 0.1982
VODAFONE VOD 216 0.0105 0.0176 0.0847 -0.2530 0.2669
NOVARTIS S:NOVN 216 0.0070 0.0069 0.0609 -0.1707 0.2594
NESTLE S:NESN 216 0.0094 0.0173 0.0523 -0.2074 0.1246
GLAXOSMITHKLINE GSK 216 0.0058 0.0051 0.0627 -0.2058 0.2659
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL H:RDSA 216 0.0067 0.0024 0.0697 -0.2999 0.2608
TOTAL F:TAL 216 0.0094 0.0098 0.0680 -0.2370 0.2101
ROCHE S:ROG 216 0.0064 0.0068 0.0644 -0.2654 0.1922
ENI I:ENI 216 0.0091 0.0115 0.0672 -0.2365 0.2219
TELEFONICA E:TEF 216 0.0093 0.0135 0.0884 -0.3293 0.3580
SANOFI F:SQ@F 216 0.0110 0.0103 0.0686 -0.1901 0.1985
NOKIA M:NOK1 216 0.0077 0.0155 0.1437 -0.4512 0.5099
SIEMENS D:SIEX 216 0.0079 0.0181 0.1046 -0.3699 0.2960
ASTRAZENECA AZN 216 0.0078 0.0100 0.0704 -0.2218 0.2523
L’OREAL F:OR@F 216 0.0102 0.0133 0.0654 -0.2592 0.1606
E ON D:EONX 216 0.0045 0.0161 0.0752 -0.3212 0.1880
BAT BATS 216 0.0148 0.0174 0.0682 -0.2396 0.2173
RIO TINTO RIO 216 0.0093 0.0189 0.1054 -0.4874 0.3274
LVMH F:LVMH 216 0.0089 0.0151 0.1039 -0.6628 0.3172
DIAGEO DGE 216 0.0096 0.0137 0.0618 -0.2476 0.1780
a) Name Ticker Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
BRITISH PETROLEUM BP. 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0173 -0.1404 0.1058
VODAFONE VOD 4,608 0.0005 0.0000 0.0218 -0.1458 0.1371
NOVARTIS S:NOVN 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0138 -0.0989 0.1824
NESTLE S:NESN 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0127 -0.0798 0.0926
GLAXOSMITHKLINE GSK 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0164 -0.1389 0.1881
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL H:RDSA 4.608 0.0003 0.0004 0.0162 -0.1032 0.1310
TOTAL F:TAL 4,608 0.0004 0.0006 0.0179 -0.1317 0.1279
ROCHE S:ROG 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0144 -0.1101 0.0987
ENI I:ENI 4,608 0.0004 0.0005 0.0174 -0.1012 0.1614
TELEFONICA E:TEF 4,608 0.0005 0.0003 0.0188 -0.0989 0.1326
SANOFI F:SQ@F 4,608 0.0005 0.0000 0.0193 -0.1401 0.1368
NOKIA M:NOK1 4,608 0.0003 0.0000 0.0304 -0.2599 0.2922
SIEMENS D:SIEX 4,608 0.0004 0.0001 0.0225 -0.1873 0.2157
ASTRAZENECA AZN 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0169 -0.1257 0.1236
L’OREAL F:OR@F 4,608 0.0005 0.0002 0.0185 -0.1179 0.1375
E ON D:EONX 4,608 0.0002 0.0000 0.0191 -0.1223 0.1813
BAT BATS 4,608 0.0007 0.0000 0.0184 -0.1220 0.3226
RIO TINTO RIO 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0260 -0.4578 0.1968
LVMH F:LVMH 4,608 0.0004 0.0000 0.0209 -0.1308 0.1562
DIAGEO DGE 4,608 0.0005 0.0000 0.0159 -0.0978 0.1540
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Table 8: Balance Sheet Variables: the table provides details on the list of variables used in the
panel. Balance sheet items are named according to SNL Financial definition.
Variable Definition
Price− to− book Equity Market V alueEquity Book V alue
LeverageA Tangible Assets−Separate Account AssetsTangible Equity
SizeA ln(Tangible Assets)
LeverageL Total Liabilities−Separate Account LiabilitiesTangible Equity
SizeL ln(Total Liabilities− Separate Account Liabilities)
Concentration†
∑
i Asset Class
2
i
(
∑
i Asset Classi)
2
Investment Quality
Total Investment Grade Assets
Tangible Assets− Separate Account Assets
Fixed Income Assets Total Debt InstrumentsTangible Assets−Separate Account Assets
Equity Assets Total Equity InstrumentsTangible Assets−Separate Account Assets
Cash Cash & Cash EquivalentsTangible Assets−Separate Account Assets
Insurance Activities Reserves for Insurance Contracts−Unit Linked InsuranceTotal Liabilities−Separate Account Liabilities
Total Debt‡ Senior;Debt+Subordinated DebtTotal Liabilities−Separate Account Liabilities
Separate Accounts Separate Account LiabilitiesTotal Liabilities
†: Asset Classi= Cash & Cash Equivalents; Funds Withheld & Deposits; Primary Insurance Receivables; Reinsurance
Receivables; Insurance Receivables; Other Loans; Total Debt Instruments; Total Equity Instruments; Securities Owned:
Derivative Financial Instruments; Securities Owned: Other Investments; Total Investment in Real Estate; Investment
in Partnerships; Reinsurance Recoverable on Loss & LAE Reserves; Fixed Assets; Total Other Assets.
‡: Senior Debt includes deposits from banking activities, whereas Subordinated Debt includes hybrid securities and
other subordinated debt.
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Table 9: Insurance Companies Extended Panel.
Descriptive statistics of Daily log returns observed between January 2005 to December 2013.
Name Obs. Average Median St.Dev. Min Max
Admiral 2,406 0.0008 0.0000 0.0207 -0.2958 0.2272
Aegon 3,892 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0302 -0.2768 0.3022
Ageas 3,892 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0377 -1.4949 0.2589
Aksigorta 3,892 0.0012 0.0000 0.0322 -0.2187 0.3176
Allianz 3,892 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0230 -0.1568 0.1781
Alm. Brand 3,892 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0229 -0.2378 0.2492
Amlin 3,892 0.0006 0.0000 0.0188 -0.3491 0.1659
Anadolu Anonim Tu¨rk Sigorta Sirketi 3,892 0.0010 0.0000 0.0301 -0.2336 0.1886
Anadolu Hayat Emeklilik 3,595 0.0007 0.0000 0.0313 -0.1707 0.1861
Generali 3,892 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0176 -0.0923 0.1231
Aviva 3,892 0.0000 0.0000 0.0266 -0.4060 0.2239
Aviva Sigorta 3,892 0.0014 0.0000 0.0343 -0.2267 0.2116
AXA 3,892 0.0000 0.0000 0.0274 -0.2035 0.1978
Baˆloise 3,892 0.0001 0.0000 0.0202 -0.1662 0.1891
Beazley 2,889 0.0007 0.0000 0.0180 -0.1404 0.1361
Chesnara 2,496 0.0007 0.0000 0.0202 -0.1075 0.1052
CNP Assurances 3,892 0.0004 0.0000 0.0189 -0.1444 0.1043
Delta Lloyd 1,080 0.0004 0.0006 0.0206 -0.0861 0.1088
Direct Line Insurance Group 315 0.0014 0.0014 0.0115 -0.0396 0.0717
Euler Hermes 3,548 0.0004 0.0000 0.0214 -0.1641 0.1462
European Reliance General Insurance Company 3,892 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0374 -0.2176 0.1815
FBD Holdings 3,892 0.0004 0.0001 0.0487 -1.9376 1.9386
Friends Life Group 1,315 0.0002 0.0000 0.0182 -0.1580 0.1108
Globos osiguranje a.d.o. Beograd 1,227 -0.0012 0.0000 0.0479 -0.2235 0.1823
Grupo Catalana Occidente 3,310 -0.0028 0.0000 0.0608 -1.4674 0.8362
Gunes Sigorta 3,892 0.0009 0.0000 0.0331 -0.2356 0.1765
Hannover Re 3,892 0.0003 0.0000 0.0220 -0.1989 0.1538
Hansard Global 1,828 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0219 -0.1550 0.1831
Helios Underwriting 1,641 0.0003 0.0000 0.0223 -0.5216 0.3909
ING Groep 3,892 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0308 -0.3213 0.2565
Jadransko Osiguranje 1,734 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0290 -0.2653 0.1856
Lancashire Holdings Limited 2,088 0.0009 0.0000 0.0136 -0.0627 0.1162
Legal & General Group 3,892 0.0002 0.0000 0.0258 -0.3408 0.2430
Liberty Life Insurance 3,892 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0489 -0.4158 0.4196
Mapfre 3,892 0.0003 0.0000 0.0219 -0.1344 0.1618
Mediolanum 3,892 0.0001 0.0000 0.0253 -0.1163 0.1710
Munich Re 3,892 0.0001 0.0000 0.0209 -0.1719 0.1653
Novae Group 3,892 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0269 -0.5556 0.3212
Nuernberger 3,892 0.0000 0.0000 0.0176 -0.2289 0.2263
Partnership Assurance Group 146 -0.0019 -0.0010 0.0307 -0.2374 0.1560
Personal Group Holdings 3,396 0.0007 0.0000 0.0114 -0.1144 0.1173
Phoenix Group 1,070 0.0002 0.0000 0.0170 -0.0853 0.1059
Pozavarovalnica Sava 1,440 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0258 -0.1389 0.1389
Protector Forsikring 1,712 0.0003 0.0000 0.0252 -0.1697 0.2230
Prudential 3,892 0.0002 0.0000 0.0272 -0.2231 0.2107
RSA Insurance Group 3,892 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0240 -0.2426 0.1321
Sampo Oyj 3,892 0.0007 0.0000 0.0197 -0.1823 0.1367
Scor 3,892 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0266 -0.3622 0.1907
St. James’s Place 3,892 0.0003 0.0000 0.0253 -0.2329 0.2394
Standard Life 1,940 0.0004 0.0000 0.0239 -0.1604 0.1865
Storebrand 560 0.0026 0.0000 0.0147 -0.0666 0.0925
Swiss Life 3,892 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0249 -0.2240 0.1877
Swiss Re 3,892 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0237 -0.3292 0.1957
Talanx 322 0.0009 0.0000 0.0140 -0.0471 0.0399
Topdanmark 3,892 0.0006 0.0000 0.0180 -0.1133 0.1407
Tryg 2,130 0.0005 0.0000 0.0160 -0.1361 0.1032
Uniqa Insurance 3,670 0.0001 0.0000 0.0170 -0.1729 0.0965
Vaudoise Assurances 3,892 0.0003 0.0000 0.0198 -0.1801 0.1869
Vienna Insurance Group 3,892 0.0003 0.0000 0.0188 -0.1974 0.1529
Zavarovalnica Triglav. 1,377 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0217 -0.1076 0.0953
Zurich Insurance Group 3,892 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0233 -0.2257 0.1920
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Table 10: Balance sheet variables: the table reports the summary statistics for 3 samples: full,
without reinsurers and without reinsurers and SIFIs.
Full Sample
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price to Book 445 2.8762 18.5761 -5.5000 382.5900
LeverageA 443 12.9052 10.3963 2.0417 55.8480
SizeA 448 16.6411 2.5930 10.0355 21.0045
LeverageL 428 13.3584 22.1188 1.0417 314.6381
SizeL 428 16.2179 2.6604 9.6472 20.9111
Concentration 449 0.3051 0.1017 0.1168 0.6099
Investment Quality 443 0.3752 0.2861 0.0000 1.0093
Fixed Income Assets 439 0.4136 0.1944 0.0000 0.7569
Equity Assets 436 0.0813 0.0858 0.0000 0.6269
Cash 443 0.0872 0.1215 0.0009 0.6619
Insurance Activities 427 0.6598 0.2383 0.0000 0.9635
Total Debt 420 0.1102 0.1660 0.0000 0.8099
Separate Accounts 428 0.1683 0.2398 0.0000 0.9280
Sample w/o Reinsurers
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price to Book 409 3.0416 19.3694 -5.5000 382.5900
LeverageA 411 13.0744 10.7641 2.0417 55.8480
SizeA 416 16.5293 2.6453 10.0355 21.0045
LeverageL 396 13.6578 22.9653 1.0417 314.6381
SizeL 396 16.0770 2.7050 9.6472 20.9111
Concentration 417 0.3106 0.1031 0.1168 0.6099
Investment Quality 411 0.3723 0.2897 0.0000 1.0093
Fixed Income Assets 407 0.4114 0.2009 0.0000 0.7569
Equity Assets 404 0.0848 0.0877 0.0000 0.6269
Cash 411 0.0912 0.1249 0.0009 0.6619
Insurance Activities 395 0.6495 0.2440 0.0000 0.9635
Total Debt 388 0.1145 0.1716 0.0000 0.8099
Separate Accounts 396 0.1793 0.2454 0.0000 0.9280
Sample w/o Reinsurers and SIFIs
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price to Book 364 3.2197 20.5261 -5.5000 382.5900
LeverageA 368 11.2150 9.1015 2.0417 55.8480
SizeA 372 16.1192 2.4930 10.0355 21.0045
LeverageL 356 12.0553 23.4185 1.0417 314.6381
SizeL 356 15.6598 2.5284 9.6472 20.9111
Concentration 372 0.3084 0.1073 0.1168 0.6099
Investment Quality 368 0.3612 0.2888 0.0000 1.0093
Fixed Income Assets 365 0.3996 0.2067 0.0000 0.7569
Equity Assets 365 0.0825 0.0894 0.0000 0.6269
Cash 368 0.0966 0.1306 0.0009 0.6619
Insurance Activities 355 0.6548 0.2543 0.0000 0.9635
Total Debt 348 0.1141 0.1784 0.0000 0.8099
Separate Accounts 356 0.1801 0.2579 0.0000 0.9280
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Table 13: DiD Variables and Expected Signs
VARIABLES dummy=0 dummy=1 ∂SR∂d.Xz
Concentration B T > 0
Investment Quality T B < 0
Fixed Income T B < 0
Equity B T > 0
Cash T B < 0
Insurance Activities T B < 0
Total Debt B T > 0
Separate Account B T > 0
T=Φ−1Xz ≥ 0.5
B=Φ−1Xz < 0.5
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Table 14: Robustness Check - DiD for ∆CoVaR, asset side specification: Shock dummy
computed around Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy and AIG bailout. Treatment groups
defined in table 13.
Robust t-statistic in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
VARIABLES ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR
Price− to− book 0.106*** 0.0890*** 0.0902*** 0.0875*** 0.0890*** 0.0797*** 0.0896*** 0.0836***
(7.594) (7.235) (6.793) (6.359) (5.932) (6.651) (6.713) (5.935)
LeverageA -0.0210* -0.0234*** -0.0126** -0.0129** -0.0111* -0.0120** -0.0124** -0.0115*
(-1.910) (-4.296) (-2.204) (-2.398) (-1.944) (-2.337) (-2.429) (-1.781)
SizeA 0.238*** 0.236*** 0.207*** 0.210*** 0.213*** 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.198***
(7.089) (6.665) (7.813) (7.769) (8.059) (8.480) (7.885) (7.974)
Concentration -1.207* -0.993** -1.410** -1.050 -1.033** -1.276** -1.602***
(-1.806) (-2.325) (-2.340) (-1.407) (-2.246) (-2.431) (-2.980)
Investment Quality -0.167 -0.177 -0.273 -0.221 -0.0916 -0.208 -0.254
(-0.652) (-0.927) (-1.217) (-0.950) (-0.470) (-1.124) (-1.098)
Fixed Income Assets -0.479 -0.214 0.306 0.207 0.0149 0.178 0.396
(-1.205) (-0.289) (0.719) (0.427) (0.0443) (0.425) (0.911)
Equity Assets -2.231** -1.625* -0.199 -0.105 -0.190 -0.0361 -0.399
(-2.301) (-1.953) (-0.258) (-0.152) (-0.283) (-0.0592) (-0.531)
Cash -1.278* -0.949 -0.341 -0.228 -0.251 0.0197 -0.319
(-1.783) (-1.458) (-0.651) (-0.486) (-0.595) (0.0422) (-0.673)
Insurance Activities 0.153 -0.315 -0.207 -0.366 -0.197 -0.110 -0.340
(0.279) (-1.100) (-0.914) (-1.199) (-0.634) (-0.545) (-1.265)
Total Debt -0.380 -0.166 -0.205 -0.274 -0.147 -0.0836 -0.183
(-1.181) (-0.785) (-0.788) (-0.908) (-0.528) (-0.439) (-0.691)
Separate Accounts 0.151 0.170 -0.113 -0.139 -0.236 -0.224 -0.0763
(0.638) (1.044) (-0.684) (-0.885) (-1.535) (-1.455) (-0.528)
d.shock 0.309* 0.471*** 0.451*** 0.361*** 0.341*** 0.255** 0.272*** 0.312***
(2.030) (4.789) (4.963) (4.136) (3.832) (2.516) (3.194) (3.559)
d.Concentration -0.0945
(-0.545)
d.shock · d.Concentration 0.159
(0.874)
d.Investment Quality -0.0415
(-0.411)
d.shock · d.Investment Quality -0.150
(-1.027)
d.Fixed Income Assets 0.0792
(0.757)
d.shock · d.Fixed Income Assets -0.0745
(-0.524)
d.Equity Assets -0.153
(-1.553)
d.shock · d.Equity Assets 0.142
(1.004)
d.Cash -0.169
(-1.463)
d.shock · d.Cash 0.144
(1.059)
d.Insurance Activities 0.0604
(0.734)
d.shock · d.Insurance Activities 0.299**
(2.355)
d.Total Debt -0.0545
(-0.616)
d.shock · d.Total Debt 0.280**
(2.072)
d.Separate Accounts -0.127
(-1.275)
d.shock · d.Separate Accounts 0.232*
(1.674)
Observations 40 48 70 70 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.725 0.713 0.671 0.682 0.682 0.720 0.700 0.686
F test 16.86 22.10 15.74 16.47 15.16 19.35 15.82 18.29
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Table 15: Robustness Check - DiD for ∆CoVaR, liability side specification: Shock dummy
computed around Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy and AIG bailout. Treatment groups
defined in table 13.
Robust t-statistic in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
VARIABLES ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR
Price− to− book 0.107*** 0.0892*** 0.0885*** 0.0863*** 0.0888*** 0.0786*** 0.0886*** 0.0822***
(7.845) (7.579) (6.321) (5.892) (5.670) (6.320) (6.319) (5.364)
LeverageL -0.0234** -0.0268*** -0.0141** -0.0143** -0.0127** -0.0134** -0.0140** -0.0147**
(-2.260) (-4.557) (-2.347) (-2.441) (-2.085) (-2.455) (-2.584) (-2.097)
SizeL 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.182*** 0.193*** 0.196***
(7.736) (6.713) (7.543) (7.433) (7.847) (8.281) (7.579) (7.434)
Concentration -1.309** -1.046** -1.348** -0.921 -0.973** -1.184** -1.474***
(-2.089) (-2.326) (-2.255) (-1.232) (-2.071) (-2.292) (-2.763)
Investment Quality -0.203 -0.192 -0.264 -0.207 -0.0843 -0.200 -0.232
(-0.841) (-0.986) (-1.171) (-0.882) (-0.433) (-1.085) (-1.059)
Fixed Income Assets -0.562 -0.263 0.220 0.0636 -0.0703 0.0742 0.289
(-1.473) (-0.371) (0.524) (0.132) (-0.213) (0.183) (0.687)
Equity Assets -2.204** -1.648** -0.137 -0.0207 -0.120 0.0244 -0.212
(-2.222) (-2.038) (-0.176) (-0.0299) (-0.176) (0.0395) (-0.279)
Cash -1.322* -0.936 -0.196 -0.140 -0.166 0.110 0.0517
(-1.905) (-1.508) (-0.358) (-0.283) (-0.376) (0.223) (0.102)
Insurance Activities 0.191 -0.264 -0.239 -0.368 -0.193 -0.103 -0.372
(0.342) (-0.940) (-0.986) (-1.138) (-0.602) (-0.502) (-1.264)
Total Debt -0.408 -0.0890 -0.194 -0.264 -0.148 -0.0776 -0.143
(-1.184) (-0.438) (-0.726) (-0.840) (-0.526) (-0.411) (-0.502)
Separate Accounts 0.527** 0.537*** 0.182 0.167 0.0783 0.0422 0.209
(2.209) (3.734) (1.087) (1.031) (0.501) (0.271) (1.396)
d.shock 0.311** 0.477*** 0.456*** 0.370*** 0.352*** 0.255** 0.283*** 0.313***
(2.074) (5.047) (4.910) (4.160) (3.899) (2.479) (3.209) (3.605)
d.Concentration -0.0856
(-0.496)
d.shock · d.Concentration 0.171
(0.943)
d.Investment Quality -0.0551
(-0.553)
d.shock · d.Investment Quality -0.162
(-1.149)
d.Fixed Income Assets 0.0685
(0.656)
d.shock · d.Fixed Income Assets -0.0714
(-0.501)
d.Equity Assets -0.137
(-1.369)
d.shock · d.Equity Assets 0.130
(0.902)
d.Cash -0.175
(-1.476)
d.shock · d.Cash 0.130
(0.939)
d.Insurance Activities 0.0627
(0.764)
d.shock · d.Insurance Activities 0.304**
(2.363)
d.Total Debt -0.0312
(-0.353)
d.shock · d.Total Debt 0.263*
(1.930)
d.Separate Accounts -0.0531
(-0.529)
d.shock · d.Separate Accounts 0.243*
(1.775)
Observations 40 48 70 70 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.732 0.732 0.666 0.674 0.677 0.716 0.693 0.682
F test 15.93 22.93 15.01 15.57 14.64 18.48 15.44 16.14
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Table 16: Robustness Check - DiD for DMES, asset side specification: Shock dummy
computed around Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy and AIG bailout. Treatment groups
defined in table 13.
Robust t-statistic in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
VARIABLES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES
Price− to− book 0.362*** 0.207** 0.236*** 0.206** 0.243*** 0.217*** 0.218*** 0.204**
(2.967) (2.189) (2.893) (2.595) (2.903) (2.707) (2.853) (2.369)
LeverageA -0.201*** -0.111*** -0.0643** -0.0559* -0.0526* -0.0614** -0.0607** -0.0459
(-3.055) (-3.165) (-2.270) (-1.924) (-1.854) (-2.380) (-2.492) (-1.484)
SizeA 1.162*** 1.015*** 0.740*** 0.759*** 0.764*** 0.710*** 0.720*** 0.718***
(4.334) (4.184) (3.907) (4.207) (4.298) (3.795) (4.080) (3.924)
Concentration -3.621 -7.211*** -9.316*** -5.766 -6.652** -8.735*** -9.069***
(-0.941) (-2.930) (-2.745) (-1.584) (-2.294) (-2.879) (-2.845)
Investment Quality -1.690 -1.994* -2.538* -2.117 -1.502 -2.632** -2.415*
(-1.231) (-1.775) (-1.932) (-1.671) (-1.350) (-2.533) (-1.920)
Fixed Income Assets -3.606 -0.620 2.260 0.472 0.286 1.422 2.471
(-1.582) (-0.164) (1.001) (0.187) (0.136) (0.756) (1.101)
Equity Assets -6.814 -5.292 2.106 2.893 3.333 1.608 2.367
(-1.332) (-1.239) (0.506) (0.824) (0.945) (0.559) (0.601)
Cash 2.017 1.101 0.683 -0.180 1.862 0.763 1.003
(0.403) (0.227) (0.220) (-0.0664) (0.684) (0.302) (0.376)
Insurance Activities -0.808 -2.285* -1.491 -2.395* -1.127 -1.968 -1.743
(-0.237) (-1.731) (-1.104) (-1.818) (-0.823) (-1.626) (-1.251)
Total Debt 1.518 1.937 1.074 -0.0952 1.026 2.182 1.020
(0.644) (0.880) (0.649) (-0.0568) (0.683) (1.453) (0.604)
Separate Accounts -1.225 -0.815 -1.218 -0.936 -1.601* -1.495 -0.749
(-0.588) (-0.476) (-1.068) (-0.866) (-1.742) (-1.457) (-0.734)
d.shock 2.059** 2.463*** 2.599*** 2.668*** 2.339*** 1.511*** 1.674*** 2.245***
(2.690) (4.669) (4.520) (4.495) (4.553) (3.026) (3.817) (3.901)
d.Concentration -1.395
(-1.373)
d.shock · d.Concentration 1.233
(1.025)
d.Investment Quality -0.435
(-0.610)
d.shock · d.Investment Quality 0.581
(0.575)
d.Fixed Income Assets -0.143
(-0.271)
d.shock · d.Fixed Income Assets 0.0240
(0.0285)
d.Equity Assets -0.502
(-0.975)
d.shock · d.Equity Assets 0.0365
(0.0462)
d.Cash -1.106**
(-2.238)
d.shock · d.Cash 0.536
(0.683)
d.Insurance Activities -0.561
(-1.104)
d.shock · d.Insurance Activities 2.012**
(2.478)
d.Total Debt -0.400
(-0.852)
d.shock · d.Total Debt 1.941**
(2.525)
d.Separate Accounts -1.140*
(-1.943)
d.shock · d.Separate Accounts 0.773
(0.974)
Observations 40 48 70 70 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.489 0.583 0.489 0.501 0.514 0.541 0.555 0.510
F test 5.232 4.059 5.964 5.150 6.218 5.180 4.995 5.854
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Table 17: Robustness Check - DiD for DMES, liability side specification: Shock dummy
computed around Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy and AIG bailout. Treatment groups
defined in table 13.
Robust t-statistic in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
VARIABLES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES DMES
Price− to− book 0.358*** 0.203** 0.232*** 0.202** 0.242*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.198**
(2.971) (2.085) (2.821) (2.493) (2.853) (2.683) (2.789) (2.246)
LeverageL -0.199*** -0.123*** -0.0715** -0.0621* -0.0594* -0.0684** -0.0669** -0.0581*
(-2.882) (-3.156) (-2.359) (-1.968) (-1.954) (-2.451) (-2.595) (-1.707)
SizeL 1.102*** 0.988*** 0.718*** 0.727*** 0.736*** 0.687*** 0.692*** 0.700***
(4.062) (4.129) (3.825) (4.050) (4.198) (3.745) (4.030) (3.739)
Concentration -4.157 -7.459*** -9.124*** -5.397 -6.471** -8.427*** -8.646***
(-1.110) (-3.025) (-2.757) (-1.513) (-2.328) (-2.864) (-2.793)
Investment Quality -1.818 -2.068* -2.502* -2.071 -1.484 -2.604** -2.319*
(-1.316) (-1.807) (-1.877) (-1.620) (-1.326) (-2.482) (-1.871)
Fixed Income Assets -3.855 -0.790 1.962 0.000219 -0.0352 1.045 2.094
(-1.649) (-0.208) (0.876) (8.79e-05) (-0.0168) (0.562) (0.947)
Equity Assets -6.336 -5.469 2.320 3.217 3.613 1.776 3.063
(-1.179) (-1.259) (0.552) (0.911) (1.010) (0.612) (0.750)
Cash 1.312 0.864 1.145 0.0494 2.087 0.980 2.247
(0.264) (0.178) (0.363) (0.0175) (0.743) (0.371) (0.795)
Insurance Activities -0.537 -2.118 -1.585 -2.418* -1.115 -1.949 -1.888
(-0.157) (-1.558) (-1.160) (-1.793) (-0.804) (-1.613) (-1.312)
Total Debt 1.425 2.260 1.164 -0.0157 1.072 2.238 1.194
(0.581) (1.022) (0.700) (-0.00917) (0.703) (1.486) (0.709)
Separate Accounts 0.498 0.784 -0.170 0.172 -0.475 -0.492 0.280
(0.248) (0.501) (-0.148) (0.155) (-0.498) (-0.482) (0.269)
d.shock 2.040** 2.482*** 2.613*** 2.700*** 2.382*** 1.514*** 1.717*** 2.245***
(2.600) (4.721) (4.485) (4.486) (4.534) (2.970) (3.828) (3.926)
d.Concentration -1.314
(-1.262)
d.shock · d.Concentration 1.302
(1.053)
d.Investment Quality -0.513
(-0.712)
d.shock · d.Investment Quality 0.531
(0.524)
d.Fixed Income Assets -0.192
(-0.360)
d.shock · d.Fixed Income Assets 0.0400
(0.0474)
d.Equity Assets -0.433
(-0.835)
d.shock · d.Equity Assets -0.00732
(-0.00911)
d.Cash -1.105**
(-2.184)
d.shock · d.Cash 0.477
(0.600)
d.Insurance Activities -0.550
(-1.092)
d.shock · d.Insurance Activities 2.028**
(2.471)
d.Total Debt -0.304
(-0.662)
d.shock · d.Total Debt 1.878**
(2.446)
d.Separate Accounts -0.859
(-1.468)
d.shock · d.Separate Accounts 0.814
(1.023)
Observations 40 48 70 70 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.461 0.577 0.484 0.492 0.508 0.536 0.548 0.503
F test 4.598 4.030 5.679 5.089 6.134 5.014 4.934 5.818
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C Figures
Figure 1: Total cause intra-industry.
The figure displays for each group the number of significant cause and receive linear Granger causality
connections over the total number of possible cause and receive connections. Statistical significance
level is set at 5%. Results are calculated using Newey West standard errors.
Jan−99 Jan−00 Jan−01 Jan−02 Jan−03 Jan−04 Jan−05 Jan−06 Jan−07 Jan−08 Jan−09 Jan−10 Jan−11 Jan−12 Jan−13 Dec−13
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Receive & Cause
 
 
Non−Financials
Insurers
Banks
Figure 2: Total cause/receive towards other industries.
The figure displays for each group the number of significant cause and receive linear Granger causality
connections over the total number of possible cause and receive connections. Statistical significance
level is set at 5%. Results are calculated using Newey West standard errors.
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Figure 3: Total cause/receive towards total system.
The figure displays for each group the number of significant cause and receive linear Granger causality
connections over the total number of possible cause and receive connections. Statistical significance
level is set at 5%. Results are calculated using Newey West standard errors.
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Figure 4: Average institutions’ ∆CoVaR intra-industry.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
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Figure 5: Average institutions’ ∆CoVaR towards other industries.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
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Figure 6: Average institutions’ ∆CoVaR towards total system.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
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Figure 7: Average institutions’ DMES intra-industry.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
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Figure 8: Average institutions’ DMES towards other industries.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
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Figure 9: Average institutions’ DMES towards total system.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
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Figure 10: Total cause towards total system - focus on SIFI Insurance Companies
The figure displays for each group the number of significant cause and receive linear Granger causality
connections over the total number of possible cause and receive connections. Statistical significance
level is set at 5%. Results are calculated using Newey West standard errors.
Jan−99 Jan−00 Jan−01 Jan−02 Jan−03 Jan−04 Jan−05 Jan−06 Jan−07 Jan−08 Jan−09 Jan−10 Jan−11 Jan−12 Jan−13
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Cause System
 
 
Non−Financials
Insurers SIFI
Insurers NO SIFI
Banks
49
Figure 11: Average institutions’ ∆CoVaR towards total system - focus on SIFI Insurance Companies.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
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Figure 12: Average institutions’ DMES towards total system - focus on SIFI Insurance Companies.
The figure displays the industry monthly average calculated on the single institution’s monthly median
value.
Jan−99 Jan−00 Jan−01 Jan−02 Jan−03 Jan−04 Jan−05 Jan−06 Jan−07 Jan−08 Jan−09 Jan−10 Jan−11 Jan−12 Jan−13 Dec−13
−18%
−16%
−14%
−12%
−10%
−8%
−6%
−4%
−2%
0
 
 
Banks
Insurers SIFI
Insurers Non SIFI
Non−Financials
50
Figure 13: Most systemically relevant institutions.
The 3 graphs report the industry composition of the 10 most systemically relevant institutions at each
point in time.
Figure 14: Cumulative index.
The graph reports the average industry composition of the 3 indices at each point in time.
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